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Abstract—The Internet has become a critical infrastructure.
This multi-disciplinary study evaluates the resilience of one
of its cornerstone assets: the Border Gateway Protocol (BGP)
infrastructure, that constitutes the backbone of the network of
networks. The study combines three complementary approaches:
a Systematic Literature Review (SLR) established an exhaustive
threat model for BGP systems; a qualitative analysis, based on
a series of interviews with major stakeholders of the Internet,
identified key specificities of the operation and governance of
backbone networks; and large scale attacks were simulated based
on a detailed study of the logical and physical topologies of
the backbone. Our first conclusions challenge the idea that
the Internet’s built-in resilience guarantees against large-scale
failures: important changes in the way the backbone is operated
and governed may be necessary to address new threats arising
in a near future.
I. GOALS AND APPROACHES
In this study, we assess the current state, governance and
management model of BGP infrastructures. We evaluate the re-
silience capabilities of these infrastructures during hypothetical
major security events, assess existing protection and recovery
solutions and investigate technical and policy improvements.
Our analysis is based on three complementary approaches:
• We conducted a Systematic Literature Review
(SLR) [1] on the topic and we established an exhaus-
tive threat model for BGP systems.
• We conducted a series of interviews with major In-
ternet stakeholders, to grasp their perception of the
backbone and identify the key specificities of the
operation and governance of such a system of systems.
• We studied the physical and logical infrastructure
through different public data sources and constructed
several complementary models of its topology. We
simulated several attack scenarios inspired from the
threat model we established, and determined that
large-scale disruptions of the backbone are possible.
II. OVERVIEW OF THE BACKBONE
BGP is the highest-level routing protocol, used to route
traffic between major Internet networks: international carriers,
Internet Service Providers (ISP), hosting platforms, cloud
providers, Content Delivery Networks (CDN) and so on. These
networks – called Autonomous Systems (AS) – exchange
routing information via BGP by advertising IP prefixes (e.g.
“1.2.[0-255].[0.255]”) identifying the range of public IPs
in a given AS. Routing information is propagated between
neighbouring ASes by building AS paths via a gossip-like
propagation – e.g. AS1 advertises its own prefix, its neighbour
AS2 advertises the same prefix with path AS2→ AS1, AS2’s
neighbour AS3 advertises path AS3→ AS2→ AS1 and so on.
ASes can be broadly classified into two categories:
• “Stub” ASes sit at the periphery of the routing table,
producing or consuming traffic while not providing
transit to any other AS.
• “Core” ASes provide connectivity to other ASes: in-
ternational carriers, Internet Service Providers. These
are therefore critical to the rest of the infrastructure :
they are the focus of the following security study.
III. THREAT MODEL
BGP was designed to be as open and simple as possible,
with little security concerns. It lacks elementary security
features such as authentication (BGP routers communicate via
unsecured TCP sockets) and path validation (the protocol does
not check the consistency of announcements). A number of
attacks are possible:
• BGP hijacks: any router can announce any prefix and
reroute traffic from its legitimate target [2].
• BGP death ray: sophisticated route announcements
can exhaust the resources of a victim router [3].
In addition to these BGP-specific attack, a number of
generic threats against the backbone must be considered:
• (D)DoS: (Distributed) Denial of Service attacks dis-
rupt a victim infrastructure via request saturation [4].
• Packet of Death: some routers can be taken down by
specific packets exploiting OS vulnerabilities [5].
• Physical attacks: geographical asset concentration in
the backbone makes it vulnerable to localised physical
attacks, as described in the following section.
IV. INFRASTRUCTURE MAPPING & ATTACK SCENARIOS
We constructed a series of maps:
• physical maps of backbone assets: routers, landlines,
undersea cables, colocation centres1.
1Central platforms dedicated to exchanging BGP traffic, concentrating high
numbers of routers and links.
• logical maps of the routing table showing the inter-
connection between ASes and potential traffic paths.
The maps reveal a number of serious pinch points of
the infrastructure at both physical and logical levels. The
geographical concentration of assets in colocation centres and
the convergence of landlines and undersea cables to the same
physical hubs is such that a single physical attack could take
down a number of core systems at the same time. The logical
reliance on limited numbers of core ASes (an example is
shown in Fig. 1) providing most of the transit to the rest of the
AS eco-system also make the backbone vulnerable: a single
successful attack (hijack, DDoS, etc.) taking down a core AS
could affect the entire infrastructure significantly.
Fig. 1. Example routing table at an international colocation centre. Each
node represents an AS, with its size proportional to the AS’s degree.
We developed attack simulations based on actual AS
routing tables [6], [7] representing significant portions of the
backbone in Europe. These simulations estimate the knock-
on effect of the death of a core AS by computing how many
routes would have to be re-routed through other core ASes.
This is a very rough estimate of the actual traffic the knock-
on effect would represent2 that gives an indication of the order
of magnitude of the traffic surge such an attack would create.
Victim: Effect on:AS-A AS-B AS-C AS-D AS-E AS-F
AS-A 15.3 21.4 10.9 8.4 7.522.3% 31.7% 15.7% 13.2% 19.1%
AS-B 15.2 12.7 9.6 6.5 5.618.3% 18.8% 13.8% 10.2% 14.3%
AS-C 21.8 12.7 8.6 5.8 5.926.2% 18.5% 12.4% 9.1% 15.1%
AS-D 11.1 9.8 8.8 11.0 5.813.3% 14.3% 13.1% 17.4% 14.8%
AS-E 8.6 6.5 6.0 10.5 4.210.4% 9.5% 8.9% 15.2% 10.7%
AS-F 7.6 5.8 6.0 5.7 4.39.1% 8.4% 8.9% 8.3% 6.7%
Fig. 2. Effect of taking down a single core AS (left column) on other core
ASes (top row): load surge is measured in absolute traffic (top number) and
relative to the usual traffic (bottom percentage). Only top core AS are shown.
Sample results in Fig. 2 show that the death of a core AS
would indeed result in a sizeable number of link redirections
2A better approach would be based on actual traffic data, which is not
publicly available.
for the rest of the backbone. For instance, the death of AS-A
(first line) would create a traffic surge from 13.2% (on AS-E*)
to 31.7% (on AS-C). Several simulations run on different data
sets show similar orders of magnitude, with many traffic surges
above 10% and up to to 50%, depending on the topology.
The reaction of the backbone to such an event is hard to
predict. In case the traffic surge proved too much for another
core AS to handle, this AS could in turn be taken down and
a cascading failure could follow, with a theoretical potential
for major disruption to the Internet eco-system. Despite the
incompleteness of the data, one must therefore conclude that
the risk of cascading failures in the backbone cannot be
ruled out as improbable a priori, and more investigations are
necessary to establish a sound evaluation of that risk.
V. BROADER PERSPECTIVES
The demonstration that cascading failures in the backbone
are theoretically possible is not the only crucial conclusion
of this study of the resilience of the Internet. It must be
appreciated in the context of the following findings:
• The Internet is mostly an uncharted territory: opera-
tors report unanimously that grey areas in their own
infrastructures – BGP and beyond – cover unexpected
behaviours and hidden dependencies. This perception
is confirmed by the limits of the publicly available
routing data used in this study. A significant mapping
and assessment effort is necessary to understand the
state and the fragilities of the backbone.
• Secure extensions of the BGP protocol – meant to
address its weaknesses by providing authentication
and path validation features – are impractical: they
introduce known additional security issues, and their
limited deployment makes them inefficient.
Beyond technical issues, governance considerations are
also essential to securing the backbone – and in such a global
system of systems, governance is an international challenge.
Balancing regulatory (static) approaches against cooperative
open models currently in use for backbone operation and
regulation will be key to achieving a sound governance of the
Internet.
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